You secured your code dependencies, is that enough?
A presentation at Owasp London in in London, UK by Anant Shrivastava
You secured your code dependencies, is that enough?
Anant Shrivastava
Anant Shrivastava
● Chief researcher @ Cyfinoid Research (Research Powered Trainings) ● 17+ yrs of corporate exposure ● Speaker / Trainer: BH/DC, c0c0n, nullcon, RootConf, RuxCon ● Project Lead: ○ Code Vigilant (Code Review Project) ○ Hacking Archives of India, ○ TamerPlatform (Android Security)
(@anantshri on social platforms) https://anantshri.info
Question : Have you heard about
SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY SBOM (SOFTWARE BILL OF MATERIAL) SOURCE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS TOOLS
Why?
Incidences • SolarWind • CodeCov • Colonial Pipeline
Resultant • EO by US President
Supply Chain issues are age old trust issues
Ken Thompson talk about Supply Chain security and inherent trust in 1983. During the lecture, Ken outlines a three-step process for altering a C compiler binary to implant a backdoor when compiling the “login” program, all without leaving any evidence in the source code. He got the idea from an older US MIL document published in 1974 titled “MULTICS SECURITY EVALUATION”
Ref
● https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf ● https://research.swtch.com/nih ● https://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/history/papers/karg74.pdf
…and it’s not going anywhere anytime soon…
In a report by European Union Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA), they state Supply Chain Compromise of Software Dependencies as one of the threats that gonna be at peak.
Ref https://www.enisa.europa.eu/p ublications/enisa-foresightcybersecurity-threats-for-2030
Effect across the globe in Govt Japan US EU India UK
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5374 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/05/11/business/japan-passes-economic-security-bill-protect-sensitive-technology/ https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2021-10460/p-54 https://www.cert-in.org.in/PDF/SBOM_Guidelines.pdf
Why now?
• Software build automation == quicker release cycle • Automated release cycle == less wait for features • Faster feature release == less inclination to upgrade dependencies • Too much focus on OSS Codebase without helping the maintainers • Impossible segregation of features and bug fixes • Automated notification of vulnerability (hedonic hamster wheel)
Work done by Dependabot in last ~5 months
Start of Feb 2025 End of June 2025
2451693 issues closed 120751 new issues created
What is Software Bill of Material
Itemized list of all the ingredients in the software Ingredients ~ thirdparty components SBoM’s are mostly for one level depth only with other levels plugged in each other.
https://www.ntia.gov/report/2021/minimum-elements-software-bill-materials-sbom
SCA Source Composition Analysis Tools
Generate or Consume SBoM Identify Outdated Software Insecure Software EOL Product And more
Question : Raise your hands if
You have SCA tooling in your organization? You follow vulnerability management practices for source code components?
Let the fun begin © Cyfinoid Research 13
Software Supply Chains beyond Code chain
• We have focused too much on Software code itself • As consumers we are dealing with too many chain not in awareness • As a Company there are dependency chains far beyond code dependencies
What other chains?
Any Software or application which allows 3rd party to add or modify functionality
pluggable modules / plugins Extensions Theming customizations
A set of chain that existed 5 months back
A developer uses a Chrome extension to manipulate AI prompts, which are then fed into Visual Studio Code through a set of AI-driven code completion extensions. The resulting code is committed to GitHub, where a set of GitHub Actions automatically run analysis and tests. The code is then containerized into a Docker image, deployed on Kubernetes, running inside an EC2 instance, built from a specific AMI.
A Chain that exists now (besides previous)
A developer uses an autonomous AI agent to write code by providing them a one liner prompt and full access to the commandline. The resulting code is committed to GitHub, where a set of GitHub Actions automatically run analysis and tests. The code is then containerized into a Docker image, deployed on Kubernetes, running inside an EC2 instance, built from a specific AMI.
Simplified Supply Chain view
Why do they matter
PRODUCTION IS HARDENED, DEV NOT SO MUCH EASIER TO COMPROMISE LESS GUARDED PATHS SMALLER ORGS EASIER TO INFILTRATE / OCCUPY / ACQUIRE
Developer Machine : Why lucrative
Lots of credentials and access Developers require a bit of lax security to get job done Exceptions in network policy rules Mostly will have admin access Multiple powerful apps (IDE, debugger etc)
Show me data don’t just imagine
Case studies: WYS Is not WYG
Content delivered differently to curl and browser
Don’t curl | sh
https://jordaneldredge.com/blog/one-way-curl-pipe-shinstall-scripts-can-be-dangerous/
Don’t pipe to shell
https://www.seancassidy.me/dont-pipe-to-yourshell.html
curl https://anantshri.info/fun/legitimate.sh | bash
Chrome Browser
• By Google (claimed as fastest) • Installer runs without admin privilege (you can cancel admin prompts)
• https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/01/dozens-ofbackdoored-chrome-extensions-discovered-on-2-6-milliondevices/
What can a browser extension do
Cookie Monster
• https://gbhackers.com/malicious-editthiscookie-extension/
Visual Studio Code
• Too many examples to count • https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/maliciousvscode-extensions-with-millions-of-installs-discovered/
Visual Studio Marketplaces
• VS Code extensions marketplace is only usable by MS Products • https://open-vsx.org “Extensions for VS Code Compatible Editors” • Just over 8 million developers depend on Open VSX across dozens of VS Code based editors including Cursor, Windsurf, Google Cloud Shell Editor, and Gitlab Web IDE • Exploiting a CI issue a malicious actor could publish malicious updates to every extension on Open VSX
• Ref: https://blog.koi.security/marketplace-takeover-how-we-couldvetaken-over-every-developer-using-a-vscode-fork-f0f8cf104d44
Homebrew
• Google ads to bring traffic • Near replica of website • Serving install.sh with fake admin password prompt
https://x.com/ryanchenkie/status/1880730173634699393
Unexpected places for code execution
https://manpages.debian.org/bookworm/apt/sources.list.5.en.html https://www.golinuxhub.com/2018/05/how-to-execute-script-at-pre-post-preun-postun-spec-file-rpm/
Unexpected places or code execution
Git exploit when git clone —recursive-submodules
Notepad++
https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-hijacked-notepad-plugin/
Notepad ++ Impersonation
• https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/help-to-take-down-parasite-site/
Cursor oh Cursor
Rulefiles
• Remember those CTF’s where flag was hidden in whitespaces • Just that but dangerous
https://www.pillar.security/blog/new-vulnerability-in-github-copilot-and-cursor-how-hackers-canweaponize-code-agents
C.I. / C.D. Systems
• Not just automation • Watch over the entire build or deployment practices • Essential Watchers in the current landscape
DEFENDING CI CD
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jun/28/2003249466/-1/-1/0/CSI_DEFENDING_CI_CD_ENVIRONMENTS.PDF
Teamcity exploitation
https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-threats/global-teamcity-exploitation-opens-door-to-solarwinds-style-nightmare
Container Images
• Don’t install software • Download containers • Docker (ish) options needed
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/malicious-containers-found-docker/ https://blog.aquasec.com/supply-chain-threats-using-container-images
Dependency Caching Servers
https://socket.dev/blog/malicious-package-exploits-go-module-proxy-caching-for-persistence
Bait and Switch
Package created with a good intent but later abused
Wordpress free plugin purchased and backdoored • https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/backdoorfound-in-wordpress-plugin-with-more-than-300-000installations/
Rogue Maintainers
- peacenotwar module sabotages npm developers in the node-ipc package to protest the invasion of Ukraine Overwrite all files with ❤ if origin is Russia or Belarus.
- Malware Civil War - 25 malicious packages in npm, with some posing as “colors.js,” and even an instance of malware authors targeting each other through a package called “lemaaa” designed to manipulate Discord accounts.
- Open source developer corrupts widely-used libraries, aQecting tons of projects - For packages color.js and faker.js, the maintainer pushed a corrupt update that triggers an infinite loop of weird characters.
So, what's the plan?
• A - Awareness: Identify and move unknown risks into known risks. • T - Trust But Verify: Every dependency, tool, and service should be validated. • O - Ongoing Monitoring: Continuous security checks to detect changes & anomalies. • M - Measure & Map: Build capabilities to answer real questions (e.g., how many machines have Chrome installed? How many plugins exist in GitHub workflows?).
Next Steps
No matter how hard I try I will not be able to cover the full breadth
Chrome Extension Auditing
https://www.extensionauditor.com/
End Point Visibility
https://www.osquery.io/
Ref: https://medium.com/quiq-blog/detecting-high-risk-chrome-extensions-with-osquerybca1a8856448
GitHub and Github Actions
Basic Common Sense ● Signed Commit ● Protected Branches ● Force reviews for pull request approval ● Force signed commits
GitHub and Github Actions
Tooling ● https://github.com/Legit-Labs/legitify ● https://best.openssf.org/SCM-BestPractices/ ● Implement allstar to enforce secure baselines in the organization. ● https://docs.zizmor.sh
Consumer : Vetting Process needed (Vet)
https://docs.safedep.io/
Consumer : Vetting Process Needed (Overlay)
Overlay is a browser extension that helps developers evaluate open source packages before picking them. It gathers data from various sources, such as Snyk Advisor, Debricked, Socket.dev, and Deps.dev, and displays them on the package pages of popular registries like npm, PyPI, and Go.
Install - https://github.com/osscar/overlay#installation
Ref - https://checkmarx.com/blog/software-supply-chain-security-leaders-collaborate-and-build-browser-extension-to-help-developers-choose-open-source/
Cloud Auditing
• ScoutSuite: https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite • Prowlet: https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler • Kube-hunter: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter • Kube-bench: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench • KubiScan: https://github.com/cyberark/KubiScan • Kubeaudit: https://github.com/Shopify/kubeaudit • Trivy: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy • Cosign: Provenance : https://github.com/sigstore/cosign
Broad Visualization of Software Supply Chain
https://github.com/SecureStackCo/visualizing-software-supply-chain?tab=readme-ov-file
Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts
https://slsa.dev/
OWASP SCVS ~ SSDF
• https://scvs.owasp.org/ • https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/ssdf
Open Software Supply Chain Attack Reference
https://pbom.dev/
Can of worms that I have not touched
SaaS
iOT
Thanks for listening & open to Questions?
@anantshri
anant @ cyfinoid.com
Supply Chain security is a new buzzword for past 2-3 years, the dust is slowly settling and we are now in the phase were people need to evaluate what is going right and what is going wrong. Large number of organisations introduced SCA tooling and SBoM creation tooling and called it the day.
Has that helped?
What has been going on in the world of supply chain security.In this talk we will explore the Supply chain security not just from a code base dependency prospective but rather wholistic approach to establishing the right controls in the system for a seamless software delivery.
Software supply chain security concerns not just the product organizations creating software of external or internal usage but also for organizations that may be just using the final product as an end user.
From your development environment to production, from downloading binaries from internet to running them on network machines we will explore the 360 degree view of supply chain security, the relevant case studies around the exploitation and what is it that industry or Govt bodies have done towards protecting people or organizations against such attacks.
Audience will leave with a holistic view of how the full supply chain of the software development looks like and thoughts on what are the possible gaps in security they might have in their organizations.
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